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INTRODUCTION 
In cases where a pregnant worker is temporarily unable to physically perform some of 
her job duties, and is denied a workplace accommodation by her employer, her main avenue for 
relief is to seek redress under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA).
1
 The PDA provides, in 
part, that an employer must treat a pregnant worker “the same for all employment-related 
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1  42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1991). 
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purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work . . . .”
2
 
In other words, unlike some areas of federal discrimination law,
3
 the PDA does not affirmatively 
require that an employer reasonably accommodate pregnancy and its related conditions; instead, 
the law simply mandates that businesses treat their pregnant workers equally as compared to other 
similarly situated, nonpregnant employees.
4
 The key issue in these cases, then, is determining who 
is similarly situated to the pregnant worker so that the court may then decide whether those other 
employees have received preferential treatment in violation of the PDA. 
For instance, imagine that a pregnant worker is unable to engage in heavy lifting due to 
her pregnancy and therefore requests that she be temporarily placed in a lighter-duty position. In 
determining whether the employee is entitled to her requested accommodation under the PDA, 
one must consider how the employer has accommodated other employees with similar lifting 
restrictions. Suppose, for example, that the employer has three employees with similar lifting 
limitations: (i) an employee who sustained an on-the-job back injury; (ii) an employee who lost a 
limb through a non-occupational injury, and who thus qualifies as disabled under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA); and (iii) an employee who threw out her back while playing tennis. 
Now assume that the employer accommodates the first and second employees—that is, those with 
an occupational injury and an ADA-qualifying disability—but does not accommodate the 
employee with the tennis injury. 
Lower courts have struggled to decide how to properly compare a pregnant employee to 
her co-workers in these situations. A majority of circuit courts of appeals that have considered the 
issue have held that even if an employer accommodates those with on-the-job or ADA-qualifying 
injuries, the PDA does not require the company to provide the same benefit to pregnant workers 
because the employer has not singled pregnancy out for exclusion, but instead has merely treated 
pregnant workers similarly to those with non-occupational injuries or conditions (e.g., like the 
worker with the tennis injury in the hypothetical above).
5
 On the other hand, one circuit court of 
appeals has adopted the plaintiff-friendly position that the plain language of the PDA requires a 
pregnant worker to receive an accommodation comparable to those enjoyed by employees with 
similar work limitations irrespective of their cause.
6
 
In Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
resolve the circuit split regarding how to identify the appropriate comparator in cases alleging 
                                                                
2  42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1991). 
3  For example, the Americans with Disabilities Act imposes an affirmative obligation requiring employers 
to reasonably accommodate disabled employees, so long as such an accommodation will not impose an undue hardship on 
the company. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2003); see also Stephen F. Befort, Reasonable Accommodation and 
Reassignment Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: Answers, Questions and Suggested Solutions After U.S Airways, 
Inc. v. Barnett, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 931, 934-35 (2003) (“The ADA’s discrimination prohibition differs from that of other 
employment discrimination statutes . . . in that it requires an employer to gauge an employee’s qualifications only after 
providing a reasonable accommodation designed to assist employee performance.”). 
4  See, e.g., Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1338, 1344 (2015) (finding that the PDA 
“requires courts to consider the extent to which an employer’s policy treats pregnant workers less favorably than it treats 
nonpregnant workers similar in their ability or inability to work.”). 
5  See, e.g., Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, L.L.C., 656 F.3d 540, 548 (7th Cir. 2011); Spivey v. Beverly 
Enters., Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 1999); Urbano v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 206 (5th Cir. 
1998). 
6  Ensley-Gaines v. Runyon, 100 F.3d 1220, 1226 (6th Cir. 1996). 
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disparate treatment under the PDA.
7
 Young involved a pregnant parcel delivery driver who was 
denied a light-duty accommodation because she did not fall within any of the various categories 
of employees covered by her employer’s workplace accommodation policy.
8
 In deciding the case, 
the Young Court explicitly rejected the plaintiff’s position that if any worker receives an 
accommodation for a work limitation, then a pregnant worker with a similar work limitation must 
be accommodated in the same manner under the PDA.
9
 But the Court also recognized that if an 
employer is already accommodating many employees with work limitations similar to those 
affecting the pregnant worker, then the employer must present a sufficient justification for why it 
cannot likewise accommodate the pregnant employee.
10
 
Along these lines, the Young Court adopted a new standard for disparate treatment cases 
arising under the PDA. Assuming that the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of 
discrimination, the Court held that the pregnant plaintiff may then establish that her employer’s 
justification for not offering an accommodation was pretextual “by providing sufficient evidence 
that the employer’s policies impose a significant burden on pregnant workers,” and therefore that 
the employer’s “reasons are not sufficiently strong to justify the burden.”
11
 In particular, the Court 
stated that a plaintiff can establish that her company’s policy significantly burdens pregnant 
workers “by providing evidence that the employer accommodates a large percentage of 
nonpregnant workers while failing to accommodate a large percentage of pregnant workers.”
12
 
While this new standard is certainly more worker-friendly than the approach previously 
espoused by a majority of circuit courts, the Court’s new formulation nevertheless fails to clarify 
how a plaintiff identifies the appropriate comparator when meeting her initial burden of 
establishing a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination under the PDA. In other words, 
returning to the hypothetical example above, does the plaintiff establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination by comparing her treatment to the employee with the tennis injury or the employee 
with an occupational injury? Or by comparing her treatment with both? Unfortunately, the 
majority opinion merely parrots the language of the PDA without resolving this issue. Moreover, 
following Young, it remains unclear precisely how dramatic the differential between an 
employer’s treatment of pregnant and nonpregnant workers must be for a plaintiff to successfully 
prove that the employer’s policy significantly burdens pregnant employees, and that the 
employer’s justifications for the policy are thus pretextual and constitute illicit discrimination 
under the PDA. 
This Article explores these issues by providing one of the first critical analyses of the 
Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. In particular, it asserts 
that Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in the case provides a clearer methodology for determining 
                                                                
7  135 S.Ct. at 1348 (“In light of lower-court uncertainty about the interpretation of the Act, we granted the 
petition [for certiorari].”). 
8  Id. at 1344. 
9  Id. at 1349. 
10  Id. at 1354-55 (“[T]he fact that UPS has multiple policies that accommodate nonpregnant employees with 
lifting restrictions suggests that its reasons for failing to accommodate pregnant employees with lifting restrictions are not 
sufficiently strong—to the point that a jury could find that its reasons for failing to accommodate pregnant employees give 
rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.”). 
11  Id. at 1354. 
12  Id. 
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the appropriate comparator when establishing a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination 
under the PDA. Quite simply, as Justice Alito notes,
13
 the plaintiff’s treatment should be more 
appropriately compared to those co-workers who both (i) perform the same or a similar job, and 
(ii) suffer from a similar work limitation. From there, the Article goes on to examine whether the 
recent enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendment Act of 2008 (ADAAA)
14
 
will largely render the Young decision moot (as the Court itself intimated).
15
 Unfortunately, 
although the ADAAA did expand the definition of a disability to potentially encompass many 
pregnancy-related conditions, courts have nevertheless refused to apply the law in most cases 
involving pregnancy-related conditions. Therefore, the Article concludes that the PDA remains an 
important source of relief for pregnant employees seeking redress under the law, meaning that the 
Young decision’s shortcomings will vex litigants and courts for the foreseeable future. 
The Article proceeds in three parts. First, Part I reviews the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act of 1978, discussing both the origins and the subsequent interpretation of the law by the courts. 
Part II then examines the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. 
Finally, Part III concludes by critically assessing the majority decision in Young, finding that the 
Court failed to sufficiently resolve the key issue posed in the case. In addition, it contends that 
despite the Young majority’s suggestion to the contrary, pregnant workers in most cases will not 
be able to secure their requested workplace accommodations by relying on the ADAAA, 
magnifying the effects of the Young decision’s shortcomings. 
I.  PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1978 
A. Pregnancy Discrimination Pre-PDA 
In 1978, Congress enacted the PDA by amending Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 “to prohibit sex discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.”
16
 The PDA was passed as a direct 
legislative repudiation of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1976 decision in General Electric Co. v. 
Gilbert,
17
 which was rooted in the reasoning of its 1974 opinion in Geduldig v. Aiello.
18
 
In Geduldig, the Court analyzed whether the state of California’s disability insurance 
system—which denied coverage for disabilities caused by pregnancy—was unconstitutional 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
19
 The 
Court held that the program did not deny benefit eligibility based on gender (which would have 
garnered a stricter standard of review) because “[t]here is no risk from which men are protected 
                                                                
13  Id. at 1357-58 (Alito, J., concurring). 
14  42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2009). 
15  Young, 135 S.Ct. at 1348 (“We note that statutory changes [the ADAAA] made after the time of Young’s 
pregnancy may limit the future significance of our interpretation of the [PDA].”). 
16  Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1991)). 
17  429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
18  417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
19  Id. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol19/iss2/2
GROW_FORMATTED_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/13/2016  9:54 AM 
2016] PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION 137 
and women are not.”
20
 Instead the Court concluded that the policy was gender-neutral because it 
distinguished between pregnant women and nonpregnant persons, which included members of 
both sexes.
21
 The Court reasoned that California’s cost concerns provided a legitimate, reasonable 
basis for denying coverage for pregnancy-related disabilities, and thus that the state had not 
violated the Equal Protection Clause.
22
 
Two years later, the Court faced a similar issue, only this time in the Title VII context, in 
Gilbert.
23
 Gilbert involved a challenge to a private employer’s (General Electric (“GE”)) 
disability-benefits plan, under which pregnancy-related disabilities were excluded from the plan’s 
coverage.
24
 Relying on its reasoning in Geduldig, the Court concluded that GE’s plan was merely 
an under-inclusive package, and not facially discriminatory on the basis of gender in violation of 
Title VII.
25
 The Gilbert court reiterated Geduldig’s rationale that there was “no risk from which 
men are protected and women are not.”
26
 Instead, the Court determined, the policy simply chose 
to cover some risks and not others, including a physical condition—pregnancy—associated 
exclusively with women.
27
 Excluding a gender-specific risk from coverage, the Court maintained, 
was not discriminatory because pregnancy was different than the other covered conditions in that 
it was not a disease but instead “often a voluntarily undertaken and desired condition.”
28
 Given 
these unique characteristics and related cost concerns, the Court held there were legitimate 
reasons for excluding pregnancy from coverage that did not mask an underlying pretext for 
gender discrimination.
29
 GE’s failure to compensate pregnant women, the Court reasoned, “does 
not destroy the presumed parity of the benefits, accruing to men and women alike, which results 
from the facially evenhanded inclusion of risks.”
30
 
The majority opinion in Gilbert generated two noteworthy dissents. First, Justice 
Brennan’s dissenting opinion argued that the majority’s conclusion that GE’s policy was “a 
neutral process of sorting risks” ignored the district court’s findings that GE had a history of 
discriminatory employment practices targeted at women.
31
 Moreover, Justice Brennan disagreed 
that there was anything gender-neutral about GE’s exclusion of pregnancy benefits. First, the so-
called voluntary nature of pregnancy should not have served as a basis for exclusion, he asserted, 
given that GE covered other voluntary conditions including sports injuries, attempted suicides, 
                                                                
20  Id. at 496-97. 
21  Id. at 496 n.20. 
22  Id. at 496. 
23  Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
24  Id. at 127. 
25  Id. at 138. 
26  Id.  
27  Id. (internal citation omitted). 
28  Id. at 136. 
29  Id.  
30  Id. at 139. 
31  Id. at 150 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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and elective cosmetic surgery.
32
 Second, the fact that pregnancy is not a disease should not have 
been a determinative factor in finding neutrality in GE’s policy given that GE also excluded 
diseases and severe complications occurring during pregnancy.
33
 
Further bolstering Justice Brennan’s disagreement with the majority that GE’s policy 
was a “sex-neutral assignment of risks” was the fact that although all conditions suffered by both 
sexes were covered, pregnancy was the only sex-specific condition singled out for exclusion in 
GE’s policy; indeed, the plan covered male-specific procedures such as vasectomies and 
circumcisions.
34
 Therefore, Justice Brennan concluded that GE’s policy violated Title VII in light 
of the fact that it was “expressive of the secondary status of women in the company’s labor 
force,” especially considering “the history of [GE’s] employment practices and the absence of 
definable gender-neutral sorting criteria . . . .”
35
 
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens found Geduldig inapposite both because 
the earlier case involved the heavier burden of proving a constitutional, as opposed to a statutory, 
violation and because it had been decided a decade after Title VII was enacted.
36
 Justice Stevens 
furthermore concluded that it was unnecessary (although persuasively argued in Justice Brennan’s 
dissent) to address GE’s underlying motives for its policy when the case was a simple matter of 
statutory construction. Put simply, he believed Gilbert posed the question: “Does a contract 
between a company and its employees which treats the risk of absenteeism caused by pregnancy 
differently from any other kind of absence discriminate against certain individuals because of 
their sex?”
37
 Justice Stevens answered the question in the affirmative because pregnancy is a 
uniquely female condition, and thus by definition GE’s policy explicitly discriminated on the 
basis of gender in violation of Title VII.
38
 
B. The PDA as a Legislative Response to Gilbert 
The dissenting opinions in Gilbert ended up carrying the day legislatively as Congress 
overruled the decision in 1978 by enacting the PDA.
39
 Congress clearly intended for the PDA to 
be read as rejecting the holding and reasoning of Gilbert,
40
 with proponents of the bill 
emphasizing that they agreed with the dissenting opinions in the case.
41
 The House Report 
                                                                
32  Id. at 151. 
33  Id.  
34  Id. at 152-53. 
35  Id. at 153. 
36  Id. at 160-61 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
37  Id. at 161. 
38  Id. at 161-62. 
39  42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1978). 
40  See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. E.E.O.C., 462 U.S. 669, 678 (1983) (“When 
Congress amended Title VII in 1978, it unambiguously expressed its disapproval of both the holding and the reasoning of 
the Court in the Gilbert decision.”). 
41  See id. at 679 (“Many of [the proponents of the bill] expressly agreed with the views of the dissenting 
Justices.”). 
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accompanying the bill that would become the PDA stated, for instance, “It is the committee’s 
view that the dissenting Justices correctly interpreted the [Civil Rights] Act,”
42
 while the Senate 
Report expressed the view that the dissenting opinions in Gilbert “correctly express both the 
principle and the meaning of [T]itle VII.”
43
 
In order to overturn the decision, the PDA added two clauses to the definitional section 
of Title VII. The first clause clarifies that “[t]he terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’” 
both include discrimination occurring “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or 
related medical conditions.”
44
 Thus, this portion of the PDA was merely intended to reaffirm the 
principle that pregnancy discrimination is a form of sex discrimination and “reestablish[] the law 
as it was understood prior to Gilbert.”
45
 Indeed, when the PDA was introduced on the floor of the 
House, Representative Hawkins noted that “it seems only commonsense, that since only women 
can become pregnant, discrimination against pregnant people is necessarily discrimination against 
women, and that forbidding discrimination based on sex therefore clearly forbids discrimination 
based on pregnancy.”
46
 
Meanwhile, the second clause of the PDA asserts that “women affected by pregnancy, 
childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related 
purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to 
work . . . .”
47
 In other words, this passage was intended to clarify that pregnant workers should be 
treated in the same manner as others similarly unable to work, thereby ensuring equal treatment of 
pregnant workers in the workplace.
48
 Along these lines, the House Report accompanying the bill 
that would become the PDA noted: 
[The PDA] unmistakably reaffirms that sex discrimination includes 
discrimination based on pregnancy, and specifically defines standards which 
require that pregnant workers be treated the same as other employees on the 
basis of their ability or inability to work. . . . This bill would prevent employers 
from treating pregnancy, childbirth and related medical conditions in a manner 
different from their treatment of other disabilities. In other words, this bill 
                                                                
42  H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 2 (1978). 
43  S. REP. NO. 95-331, at 2-3 (1977); see also 123 CONG. REC. 7541 (1977) (statement of Sen. Mathias) (“I 
am pleased to join today with several of my distinguished colleagues in both Houses in introducing legislation to 
counteract the Supreme Court’s decision in General Electric versus Gilbert.”). 
44  42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1978). 
45  S. REP. NO. 95-331, at 8 (1977).   
46  123 CONG. REC. 10581 (1977) (statement of Rep. Hawkins). 
47  42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012). 
48  See Joanna L. Grossman & Gillian L. Thomas, Making Pregnancy Work: Overcoming the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act’s Capacity-Based Model, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 15, 33 (2009) (“The second clause specifically 
requires equal treatment with a defined comparison group—workers who are temporarily disabled by causes other than 
pregnancy, but similar in their ability or inability to work.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Deborah A. Widiss, 
Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 961, 1013 (2013) (“Moreover, as opposed to a prohibition on discriminatory adverse actions—that is, 
setting forth what employers may not do—the second clause of the PDA places an affirmative obligation on employers. 
They shall treat pregnant employees the same as other employees with similar abilities.”). 
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would require that women disabled due to pregnancy, childbirth or other related 
medical conditions be provided the same benefits as those provided other 
disabled workers.
49
 
Thus, as the U.S. Supreme Court has noted, the PDA’s second clause was intended “to 
illustrate how discrimination against pregnancy is to be remedied.”
50
 
C. Applying the PDA’s Second Clause to Discriminatory Acts 
Because the PDA takes the form of a definitional amendment to Title VII, rather than a 
separate substantive statute, it is embedded in the existing Title VII framework
51
 and thus “finds 
force through the substantive sections of [Title VII].”
52
 In other words, the same Title VII 
principles that apply to sex discrimination apply to pregnancy discrimination under the PDA.
53
 As 
such, pregnant workers have asserted two main types of claims under the law. First, a pregnant 
worker alleging discrimination can assert that her employer has engaged in intentional, “disparate 
treatment” discrimination.
54
 Second, a pregnant worker can allege that the employer’s practices, 
although facially neutral and not intended to discriminate, in fact disproportionately affected 
pregnant workers, i.e., a disparate impact discrimination claim.
55
 
1. Disparate Treatment Liability 
A plaintiff alleging disparate treatment must show that an employer intentionally 
discriminated against her because she was pregnant.
56
 Either direct or indirect evidence can 
                                                                
49  H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 3, 5 (1978). See also Mary DeLano, The Conflict Between State Guaranteed 
Pregnancy Benefits and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act: A Statutory Analysis, 74 GEO. L.J. 1743, 1751-52 & 1751 n.50 
(1986) (providing an exhaustive list of references to equal treatment in the PDA’s legislative history).   
50  California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285 (1987).   
51  See DeLano, supra note 49, at 1747 (“By including pregnancy in the definition of sex, the PDA’s first 
clause incorporates title VII’s substantive principles on sex discrimination.”). 
52  Scherr v. Woodland Sch. Cmty. Consol. Dist. No. 50, 867 F.2d 974, 978 (7th Cir. 1988). 
53  Id. at 978-79; see also Jeanette R. Blair, Pregnancy Discrimination, 2 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 595, 602 
(2001) (“Pregnancy claims take the same form as those available generally under Title VII.”). 
54  See Scherr, 867 F.2d at 979 (“Because the PDA is part of Title VII and derives its substance and 
procedures from the Act as a whole, a claim of pregnancy discrimination, like any other claim of discrimination under 
Title VII, may be based either on a theory of disparate treatment or a theory of disparate impact.”); Jamie L. Clanton, 
Toward Eradicating Pregnancy Discrimination at Work: Interpreting the PDA to “Mean What It Says”, 86 IOWA L. REV. 
703, 710 (2001) (“Under the PDA, a pregnant worker has two avenues for maintaining a valid claim of pregnancy 
discrimination: she can provide evidence demonstrating either disparate impact or disparate treatment.”). 
55  See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577-78 (2009) (discussing disparate treatment compared to 
disparate impact cases generally); Spivey v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1312-14 (11th Cir. 1999) (explaining 
disparate treatment versus impact in the context of pregnancy discrimination). 
56  See, e.g., Garcia v. Woman’s Hosp. of Texas, 143 F.3d 227, 231 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding the plaintiff 
failed to show her employer’s “policies or their application intentionally treated her differently than non-pregnant 
employees because of her pregnancy (i.e., disparate treatment). . . .”); Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp., Inc., 33 F.3d 1308, 
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establish intentional discrimination.
57
 Evidence is direct “if it establishes discriminatory motive 
with no need for an inference or a presumption.”
58
 Direct evidence of pregnancy-based sex 
discrimination, for instance, would include an explicit policy classifying pregnant workers 
differently than other workers or excluding pregnant workers from a job opportunity.
59
 
Alternatively, discriminatory statements made by the employer, particularly during a decisional 
process, can also be direct evidence of discrimination.
60
 
If a plaintiff does not have any direct evidence of discrimination, she can instead pursue 
a disparate treatment claim with indirect or “circumstantial evidence from which an inference of 
intentional discrimination may be drawn.”
61
 The first step to creating an inference of intentional 
discrimination is to establish a prima facie case under the burden-shifting framework established 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
62
 a Title VII racially 
discriminatory hiring case.
63
 A plaintiff using indirect evidence to ferret out a discriminatory 
motive can establish a prima facie case by demonstrating: (i) her membership in a protected class; 
(ii) that she suffered an adverse employment action; (iii) that she is otherwise qualified; and (iv) 
that others similarly situated but outside the protected class were more favorably treated.
64
 
Once the prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the employer to provide, by 
a preponderance of evidence, a “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for” treating employees 
outside the protected class better than employees within the protected class.
65
 The plaintiff may 
                                                                
1313 (11th Cir. 1994) (identifying two separate theories—disparate treatment or intentional discrimination and disparate 
impact—for pregnancy discrimination claims). 
57  See, e.g., Armstrong, 33 F.3d at 1313 (“If direct evidence of discriminatory intent is not available, a 
plaintiff may present circumstantial evidence from which an inference of intentional discrimination may be drawn.”); 
Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Different kinds and combinations of evidence 
[including direct and circumstantial] can create a triable issue of intentional discrimination.”). 
58  Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 707 F.3d 437, 446 (4th Cir. 2013). 
59  29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(a) (2012) (“A written or unwritten employment policy or practice which excludes 
from employment applicants or employees because of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions is in prima facie 
violation of title VII.”); Garcia, 143 F.3d at 231 (“Intentional disparate treatment may be achieved via a policy which on 
its face classifies pregnant employees differently from other non-pregnant employees.”). 
60  Julie Manning Magid, Pregnant with Possibility: Reexamining the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 38 
AM. BUS. L.J. 819, 845 (2001) (“Discriminatory statements made by the employer can be direct evidence of discrimination 
if made during a key decisional process, but if these comments are made outside the decisional process or are not causally 
related to the decision making process itself, they are viewed as isolated comments.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
61  Armstrong, 33 F.3d at 1313. 
62  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
63  Young, 707 F.3d at 446; Gerner v. Cnty. of Chesterfield, 674 F.3d 264, 266 (4th Cir. 2012). 
64  Young, 707 F.3d at 449–50; Urbano v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 206 (5th Cir. 1998); see 
also Jessica Carvey Manners, The Search for Mr. Troupe: The Need to Eliminate Comparison Groups in Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act Cases, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 209, 213 (2005) (stating that in a PDA case, the fourth prong of a prima facie 
case “incorporates the second clause of the PDA” and rather than proving the plaintiff was replaced by a nonpregnant 
employee, “a PDA plaintiff asserts ‘that others similarly situated were more favorably treated.’”). 
65  Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 
at 802). 
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then respond by establishing that a preponderance of the evidence shows that the employer’s 
allegedly legitimate reasons for the discrimination were, in fact, pretextual and not the true reason 
for the differential treatment.
66
 
2. Disparate Impact Liability 
Alternatively, even if the employer lacked a discriminatory motive, a plaintiff can still 
pursue a case if the effect of the employer’s facially neutral policy was nonetheless discriminatory 
in that it disproportionately negatively impacted pregnant workers.
67
 To establish a prima facie 
disparate impact claim, “the plaintiff must identify the specific employment practice that 
allegedly has a disproportionate impact” and “demonstrate causation by offering statistical 
evidence sufficient to show that the challenged practice has resulted in prohibited 
discrimination.”
68
 The employer can then defeat liability by showing that the practice is job-
related and represents a business necessity.
69
 
Courts have been hesitant to accept disparate impact claims in pregnancy discrimination 
cases, frequently requiring statistical evidence to support a contention that a neutral policy is 
being applied in a discriminatory manner; thus most plaintiffs pursue disparate treatment claims.
70
 
For instance, in a case involving a pregnant nurse’s assistant who sought a lifting accommodation, 
the court held that the employee failed to establish a disparate impact claim because she did not 
provide any statistical evidence showing that her employer’s modified duty policy of only 
accommodating employees injured on the job disproportionately impacted pregnant workers.
71
 
In another case, a school district’s leave policy—which “barred teachers from taking 
maternity leave immediately following a period of disability for which they used sick leave”—
was challenged as disparately impacting pregnant teachers because it effectively prevented them 
from using their sick days for pregnancy-related disabilities, causing them to accumulate a greater 
number of sick days than nonpregnant teachers.
72
 The court concluded, however, that the plaintiff 
                                                                
66  Id. 
67  Spivey v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1312, 1314 (11th Cir. 1999). 
68  Id. at 1314 (internal citations omitted). 
69  Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012); Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986–99 
(1988) (explaining plaintiff’s burden when establishing a prima facie disparate impact case in the context of racial 
discrimination). 
70  See Sheerine Alemzadeh, Claiming Disability, Reclaiming Pregnancy: A Critical Analysis of the ADA’s 
Pregnancy Exclusion, 27 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 1, 7 (2012) (“[C]ourts have been historically reluctant to apply 
disparate impact analysis to workplace policies that disproportionately affect pregnant women because they have viewed 
such challenges as a ‘backdoor’ route to preferential treatment for pregnant women.”); Clanton, supra note 54, at 710 n.43 
(“Even more challenging [than identifying a facially nondiscriminatory policy implemented in a discriminatory fashion] is 
then finding statistical evidence to support a disparate impact claim.”); Deborah Dinner, The Costs of Reproduction: 
History and the Legal Construction of Sex Equality, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 485–88 (2011) (noting courts are 
“particularly reluctant to recognize [pregnancy] disparate-impact claims” and providing numerous theories for this 
hostility); Laura Schlichtmann, Accommodation of Pregnancy-Related Disabilities on the Job, 15 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 335, 381 (1994) (“[S]everal cases applying disparate impact analysis under the PDA have set exceedingly stringent 
criteria for the plaintiff’s initial showing of differentially adverse impact.”). 
71  Spivey, 196 F.3d at 1314. 
72  Maganuco v. Leyden Cmty. High Sch. Dist. 212, 939 F.2d 440, 442 (7th Cir. 1991).   
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had failed to provide any evidence that pregnant women accumulated a greater number of sick 
days than their nonpregnant counterparts, defeating her disparate impact claim.
73
 Meanwhile, in 
Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., an employer’s strict absenteeism policy, where workers were 
fired if they missed more than three days of work during a probationary period, was found to not 
disparately impact pregnant workers because there was no evidence pregnant workers were 
treated any differently than other probationary employees who missed work.
74
 
Admittedly, although rare, a few pregnant women have had success asserting a disparate 
impact claim against their employers. For instance, female police officers have successfully 
asserted that a police department’s failure to grant light-duty assignments for off-the-job injuries 
or conditions disparately impacted pregnant police officers.
75
 Nonetheless, given the difficulty in 
establishing the requisite statistical evidence in support of a disparate impact claim, most pregnant 
workers whose employers failed to provide accommodations have sought redress under a 
disparate treatment theory of liability.
76
 
3. Conflicting Circuit Court Treatment of Disparate Treatment Cases Under the PDA 
Recall that the PDA’s second clause provides that employers must treat pregnant 
employees “the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but 
similar in their ability or inability to work . . . .”
77
 If a pregnant worker is seeking a lifting 
accommodation at work, for instance, the court must look at how the employer treats other 
nonpregnant employees with similar lifting restrictions. As a result, much of the disparate 
treatment litigation arising in a pregnancy discrimination context has centered on the employee’s 
and employer’s differing visions for who is similarly situated to the plaintiff—or, in other words, 
who is an accurate comparator—in order to determine whether that person or group is receiving 
more favorable treatment than the pregnant employee, as required under the fourth prong of 
McDonnell Douglas. 
Unfortunately for would-be plaintiffs, prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., lower courts were split regarding how to identify the proper 
comparator in a case asserting disparate treatment under the PDA. In particular, while the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a broad view of the relevant comparator, most circuits had taken 
a much more restrictive view of who the plaintiff must show had received more favorable 
treatment. 
                                                                
73  Id. at 444. 
74  282 F.3d 856, 859–61 (5th Cir. 2002). 
75  Lochren v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. CV 01-3925 (ARL), 2008 WL 2039458, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 9, 2008) 
(following the jury trial, the County entered into a consent decree with the plaintiffs allowing light duty for pregnant 
police officers). 
76  See Clanton, supra note 54, at 710 (“Because proving disparate impact often is very difficult, most 
plaintiffs opt instead to show that their employers intentionally discriminated against them under a disparate treatment 
analysis.”). 
77  42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012). 
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a. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ Focus on Similarity of Work Limitation 
In Ensley-Gaines v. Runyon, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the most 
plaintiff-friendly view of the accurate comparator under the PDA, holding that the plaintiff should 
be compared to “nonpregnant employees similarly situated with respect to their ability to work.”
78
 
In Ensley-Gaines, the plaintiff, a U.S. Postal Service mailhandler, was granted light-duty status 
after her doctor advised her to lift no more than fifteen pounds and refrain from standing for more 
than four hours at a time during her pregnancy.
79
 Plaintiff maintained, however, that her light-duty 
status was “in name only” because although she could have performed a full day’s worth of work 
sitting down, she was only allowed to work while standing and therefore had to go home after 
working only four hours each day, requiring her to use sick leave, annual leave, or take leave 
without pay.
80
 
The Sixth Circuit explained that although “Title VII generally requires that a plaintiff 
demonstrate that the employee who received more favorable treatment be similarly situated ‘in all 
respects,’ . . . the PDA requires only that the employee be similar in his or her ‘ability or inability 
to work.’”
81
 The court found the plaintiff met her burden of establishing a prima facie case of 
discrimination in the case because she had identified various individuals receiving preferential 
treatment who had similar lifting restrictions, including mailhandlers with on-the-job injuries who 
were given accommodations for a full eight-hour workday.
82
 
In sum, then, rather than focusing on how a worker sustained an injury or condition—
i.e., whether or not it was an occupational injury—the Sixth Circuit believed that courts should 
focus instead on whether other workers suffer a similar work limitation. Thus, if a nonpregnant 
worker with a lifting restriction is accommodated, a pregnant worker with a similar lifting 
restriction should likewise be accommodated. 
b. Majority of Circuit Courts’ Focus on the Source of the Injury/Condition 
However, every other circuit court to consider the issue of who constitutes the relevant 
comparator under the PDA had adopted a different approach. These courts focused instead on the 
source of the injury by comparing the pregnant worker’s treatment to those employees who had 
sustained a non-ADA-qualifying, off-the-job injury. For example, in Urbano v. Continental 
Airlines, the Fifth Circuit considered a case in which an airline ticketing agent had requested a 
transfer to a service center position, which did not involve lifting baggage, due to her doctor’s 
orders to refrain from lifting more than twenty pounds during her pregnancy.
83
 While the plaintiff 
argued that she should be treated the same as employees injured on the job who were granted 
lifting accommodations, the Fifth Circuit disagreed that employees with occupational injuries 
were the accurate comparison group. Instead, the court found that the airline’s decision to deny 
                                                                
78  Ensley-Gaines v. Runyon, 100 F.3d 1220, 1226 (6th Cir. 1996) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Int’l Union 
v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 204–05 (1991)). 
79  Id. at 1222-23. 
80  Id. at 1223. 
81  Id. at 1226 (internal citations omitted). 
82  Id.  
83  Urbano v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 205 (5th Cir. 1998). 
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her request did not violate the PDA because she was treated the same as any other employee with 
a non-occupational injury or condition.
84
 In the court’s view, the accurate comparators were thus 
employees with off-the-job injuries who were not accommodated, and because she was treated the 
same as those employees, the airline was judged not to have run afoul of the PDA. To hold 
otherwise, the court reasoned, would be to grant pregnant workers preferential treatment when the 
PDA merely requires equal treatment with those similar in their inability to work.
85
 
Likewise, in Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, a nursing home activity director’s 
doctor told her that she should not engage in heavy lifting after she experienced spotting and 
cramping during her pregnancy, and had previously suffered a miscarriage.
86
 She submitted a 
request to the nursing home that she be excused from certain activities associated with her job, 
such as wheeling patients to activities, moving tables, and standing on a stool to update an activity 
calendar.
87
 However, the employer’s modified work policy only accommodated those with on-
the-job injuries or employees with non-work-related injuries who qualified for accommodation 
under the ADA.
88
 Because the employee did not fall into either category, the employer denied her 
request and terminated her employment because she could no longer perform the essential 
functions of her job.
89
 After the employee sued, the Seventh Circuit found that there were no 
“similarly-situated nonpregnant employees” who were treated more favorably than plaintiff—i.e., 
no worker with a non-ADA-covered, off-the-job injury was granted a light-duty 
accommodation—and thus that the plaintiff had not established a prima facie case of pregnancy 
discrimination.
90
 
Similarly, in Spivey v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit also found that the 
appropriate comparator to a pregnant nurse’s assistant needing a lifting accommodation was an 
employee with non-occupational injuries.
91
 The court held that the proper analysis was for an 
employer to ignore the pregnancy and treat the plaintiff like any other employee injured off the 
job.
92
 Because the plaintiff had failed to show that her employer had accommodated any 
colleagues who had been similarly injured off the job, the court denied her disparate treatment 
claim.
93
 
Thus, under the majority view of the PDA, even if an employer accommodated those 
injured on the job, it was not required to similarly accommodate a pregnant worker because she 
was not similarly situated to that subclass. In other words, a pregnant worker was only entitled to 
be treated as well (or as poorly) as those injured off the job.
94
 Courts often justified using this 
                                                                
84  Id. at 206. 
85  Id. at 207. 
86  656 F.3d 540, 546 (7th Cir. 2011).   
87  Id. 
88  Id. 
89  Id. Plaintiff had not worked for her employer long enough to qualify for FMLA leave. Id. 
90  Id. at 552. 
91  196 F.3d 1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 1999). 
92  Id. 
93  Id. at 1313-14. 
94  See Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Employers can treat pregnant 
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subclass of employees (with non-ADA qualifying, off-the-job injuries) as a comparator by noting 
that the PDA requires only equal treatment and not an affirmative mandate to reasonably 
accommodate pregnancy or provide preferential treatment compared to similarly-situated 
employees, i.e., those injured off the job.
95
 Absent evidence of pretext, a pregnancy-blind policy 
(such as only providing light duty to on-the-job injuries) would thus be upheld because pregnant 
workers were being treated the same as others injured off the job. 
c. Scholarly Concern with the Prevailing Circuit Court Interpretation of Accurate Comparators 
Some scholars were critical of the fact that, prior to Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 
a majority of the circuit courts used nonpregnant employees with non-ADA, off-the-job injuries 
as the relevant comparative baseline to pregnant workers seeking accommodations.
96
 In particular, 
these scholars contended that the majority rule’s line of reasoning, in which courts attempt to 
avoid giving preferential treatment to pregnant workers by narrowing the class of valid 
comparators, had “virtually closed the door on pregnancy discrimination claims, except in the 
most egregious cases.”
97
 One scholar noted that women find themselves in a “catch twenty-two” 
when trying to find a perfect comparator because “[o]ften there is no one else who has been in 
plaintiff’s situation, or, if there are others, they are all members of the protected class—pregnant 
women.”
98
 
In addition, some have argued that comparing pregnancy to non-occupational injuries is 
flawed because pregnancy is “a natural, likely occurrence for many women of childbearing age” 
and thus qualitatively different than a pulled muscle occurring outside work.
99
 Scholars maintain 
                                                                
women as badly as they treat similarly affected but nonpregnant employees . . . .”). 
95  See, e.g., Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637, 643 (6th Cir. 2006) (“The district court correctly 
noted that [plaintiff’s] view of the law demands preferential, not equal treatment, and therefore finds no support in the 
Act.”); Urbano v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 208 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[Plaintiff’s] claim is thus not a request for 
relief from discrimination, but rather a demand for preferential treatment; it is a demand not satisfied by the PDA.”); 
Dinner, supra note 70, at 483-84 (“Courts that limit the appropriate comparison group to employees with non-occupational 
injuries interpret the PDA to establish a mere prohibition on unequal treatment, incompatible with a claim for 
accommodation. . . . Another court characterizes the majority of courts as holding that the PDA ‘does not impose an 
affirmative obligation on employers to grant preferential treatment to pregnant women.’”) (citing Urbano, 138 F.3d at 
207). 
96  See, e.g., Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, Unprotected Sex: The Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
at 35, 21 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 67, 87 (2013) (“In what appears to be a growing trend, courts have undercut 
pregnant workers’ rights under clause two [of the PDA] by carving out exceptions from the classes of workers to which 
pregnant women may compare themselves.”); Dinner, supra note 70, at 484 (“Advocacy for a broad comparison group in 
disparate-treatment cases regarding light-duty accommodations represents not a departure from the PDA’s norms but 
rather continuity with the goals of activists who mobilized for the legislation.”); Widiss, supra note 48, at 962 (“The 
unduly narrow conception of comparators currently used by some courts interpreting the PDA risks relegating pregnancy 
once again to the basement.”). 
97  Clanton, supra note 54, at 728. 
98  Judith G. Greenberg, The Pregnancy Discrimination Act: Legitimating Discrimination Against Pregnant 
Women in the Workforce, 50 ME. L. REV. 225, 241 (1998). 
99  Clanton, supra note 54, at 732; see also Greenberg, supra note 98, at 243-44 (“Although it is unusual for 
a court to admit that there is no comparable group of nonpregnant employees with whom the plaintiff can compare herself, 
locating such a group is frequently very difficult. This is because pregnancy is a unique condition and imposes unique 
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that this is why the drafters of the PDA avoided these artificial distinctions regarding the source of 
the condition and focused instead on the effects of the condition, with the statutory language 
comparing employees “similar in their ability or inability to work.”
100
 Consequently, many have 
argued that, in line with the plain language of the PDA, courts should focus on the employee’s 
ability to work rather than the source of the injury when determining the proper comparator.
101
 
II.  YOUNG V. UPS 
In Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court entered the fray to 
resolve the circuit split regarding who is the appropriate comparator for purposes of determining 
whether pregnant women are being treated equally as required by the PDA. In order to provide 
the necessary context for a discussion of the Supreme Court’s opinion, a brief summary of the 
facts and procedural history of the case is instructive. 
A. Background and District Court Opinion 
Peggy Young worked as a part-time air driver for UPS, a job consisting of picking up 
and delivering packages arriving by air carrier.
102
 This position required Young to be able to lift 
seventy pounds, although Young maintained that she rarely had to lift more than twenty 
pounds.
103
 When Young became pregnant, her doctor advised her to lift no more than twenty 
pounds and Young requested a reassignment to a light-duty position at UPS.
104
 UPS’s policy, 
however, was to only grant such an accommodation to employees who: (i) had been injured on 
the job; (ii) were eligible for an accommodation under the ADA; or (iii) had lost their Department 
of Transportation (DOT) certification as a commercial driver because of a failed medical exam, 
lost driver’s license, or involvement in a motor vehicle accident.
105
 Because Young did not fall 
into any of these categories, UPS denied her requested light-duty accommodation. As a result, 
because she could no longer perform the essential functions of an air driver due to her lifting 
restriction, she was forced to take an extended leave of absence without pay or medical 
coverage.
106
 She returned to work after giving birth and ultimately filed a complaint in federal 
                                                                
burdens on women who become pregnant. When else would you find a previously satisfactory worker who suddenly 
begins to be egregiously late for work (because of morning sickness), whose lateness can be expected to continue for 
numerous weeks, who has a scheduled leave coming up, and who can be expected to return after that leave with no further 
lateness issues?”). 
100  Clanton, supra note 54, at 732 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1978)). 
101  Id. at 731 (“Because the referent used in Ensley-Gaines for the disparate treatment analysis best 
advances the meaning and purpose of the PDA, that approach [based on ability to work] should be adopted.”); Greenberg, 
supra note 98, at 254 (“The crucial step in protecting pregnant employees from adverse employment decisions based on 
discriminatory stereotypes is to force courts and employers to focus on the employees’ abilities.”). 
102  Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 707 F.3d 437, 440 (4th Cir. 2013). 
103  Id.  
104  Id. 
105  Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5, Young v. United Parcel Service, 
Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1338 (2015) (No. 12-1226), 2014 WL 4536939. 
106  Id. 
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district court alleging, among other things, disparate-treatment pregnancy discrimination under 
Title VII.
107
 
The district court granted UPS’s motion for summary judgment because Young had 
failed to show any direct evidence of pregnancy discrimination. In particular, the court 
emphasized the fact that none of the three categories of accommodated employees under UPS’s 
policy in any way referenced gender.
108
 The court also concluded that Young had failed to 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination with indirect evidence because she could not 
identify a similarly situated comparator who received more favorable treatment, i.e., one who had 
been granted a light-duty accommodation.
109
 The court found Young was not similarly situated to 
the three categories of accommodated employees under UPS’s policy because (i) she was 
ineligible for an ADA accommodation; (ii) she did not sustain an on-the-job injury; and (iii) she 
“possessed a physical impairment that stymied her ability to lift” rather than a legal obstacle that 
prevented her from driving like those employees who had lost their DOT certification.
110
 Because 
UPS treated Young and “some class of non-pregnant employees equally harsh,” in the district 
court’s view there could be no reasonable inference that UPS had “animus directed specifically at 
pregnant women,” defeating her disparate treatment claim.
111
 
B. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’ Opinion 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment. With regards to the direct evidence of discrimination, the court found that UPS’s light-
duty policy was “pregnancy-blind” as it treated pregnant and nonpregnant workers alike and thus 
did not provide direct evidence of discriminatory animus.
112
 
As to establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment discrimination using indirect 
evidence, the court focused on the main issue in dispute: the requirement under the McDonnell 
Douglas framework that Young establish that “similarly-situated employees outside the protected 
class received more favorable treatment than [her].”
113
 The court held that the PDA did not 
require accommodation of pregnant employees just because some—but not all—similarly-situated 
nonpregnant workers were accommodated.
114
 To hold otherwise, the court reasoned, would be to 
grant pregnant workers a “most favored nation” status compared to any other class protected by 
Title VII, with any benefit provided to a nonpregnant worker constituting evidence of 
discrimination if not also provided to any and all pregnant workers.
115
 
                                                                
107  Id. at *6. 
108  Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. DKC 08-2586, 2011 WL 665321, at *10-12 (D. Md. Feb. 14, 
2011). 
109  Id. at *14. 
110  Id. at *13. 
111  Id. at *14. 
112  Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 707 F.3d 437, 446-48 (4th Cir. 2013). 
113  Id. at 450. 
114  Id. at 446-47. 
115  Id. at 446. 
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At the same time, the court concluded that Young was not similar in her ability to work 
to the three categories of employees entitled to accommodation under UPS’s policy, and thus that 
those workers were not accurate comparators for determining liability under the PDA. 
Specifically, because Young’s “lifting limitation was temporary” and not eligible for 
accommodation under the ADA, she was viewed as being dissimilar to the first category of ADA-
accommodated employees under UPS’s policy.
116
 Second, she was also viewed as being 
dissimilar to those who had lost their DOT certification not only because “no legal obstacle stands 
between her and her work,” but also because those individuals “maintained the ability to perform 
any number of demanding physical tasks.”
117
 Finally, she was “not similar to employees injured 
on the job because, quite simply, her inability to work [did] not arise from an on-the-job 
injury.”
118
 
Instead, the Fourth Circuit found Young was more similar to “an employee who injured 
his back while picking up his infant child or . . . an employee whose lifting limitation arose from 
her off-the-job work as a volunteer firefighter,” neither of whom were eligible for accommodation 
under UPS’s policy.
119
 Without showing a similarly-situated employee received more favorable 
treatment, the court held that Young had failed to establish a prima facie case for pregnancy 
discrimination using indirect evidence, and as a result affirmed the district court’s decision.
120
 
C. U.S. Supreme Court Decision 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve how to interpret the requirement in the 
second clause of the PDA that pregnant women “be treated the same for all employment-related 
purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.”
121
 
Specifically, the Court was tasked with deciding how the PDA “applies in the context of an 
employer’s policy that accommodates many, but not all, workers with nonpregnancy-related 
disabilities.”
122
 Despite ultimately rejecting both parties’ proposed interpretation of the PDA, a 
six-to-three majority of the Court voted to reverse the Fourth Circuit decision. 
In particular, Young argued that if “an employer accommodate[d] only a subset of 
workers with disabling conditions,” then any “pregnant workers [with similar limitations must] 
receive the same treatment even if still other nonpregnant workers do not receive 
accommodations.”
123
 The Court held that such an interpretation of the PDA went too far, 
however, reasoning that it would require the accommodation of pregnant workers even if an 
employer was accommodating only a small group of nonpregnant employees whose injuries, for 
                                                                
116  Id. at 450.  
117  Id. 
118  Id. at 450-51. 
119  Id. at 448. 
120  Id. at 451. 
121  Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1338, 1344-45 (2015) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)). 
122  Id. at 1344. 
123  Brief for Petitioner at 28, Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1338 (2015) (No. 12-1226), 
2014 WL 4441528.  
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instance, had been sustained while performing extra-hazardous work for the company.
124
 In line 
with the reasoning expressed by a majority of the circuit courts, the court found the intent of the 
PDA was not “to grant pregnant workers an unconditional most-favored-nation status.”
125
 Indeed, 
because the second clause of the PDA used the phrase “other persons,” the Court determined that 
it should not be read to “say that the employer must treat pregnant employees the ‘same’ as ‘any 
other persons.’”
126
 
Yet, at the same time, the Court also found UPS’s reading of the PDA—which viewed 
the second clause of the statute as merely clarifying that pregnancy discrimination is a form of sex 
discrimination—to be too narrow.
127
 The Court held that this reading of the provision would 
render it superfluous because the PDA’s first clause already makes clear that discrimination on 
the basis of sex includes differential treatment occurring due to pregnancy.
128
 Moreover, the Court 
noted, the clear intent of the PDA was to “overrule the holding in Gilbert and to illustrate how 
discrimination against pregnancy is to be remedied.”
129
 Interpreting the PDA to merely clarify 
that pregnancy discrimination is a form of sex discrimination would not accomplish that 
objective.
130
 
After refusing to adopt either party’s interpretation of the PDA’s second clause, the 
Court instead fashioned a new approach to the McDonnell Douglas framework in cases asserting 
disparate treatment under the PDA via indirect evidence. Under the new formulation, which the 
Court limited solely to the PDA context,
131
 plaintiff’s initial four-part burden is still the same. She 
must show that: (i) she is a member of a protected class; (ii) she sought an accommodation; (iii) 
the employer failed to accommodate her, and (iv) “the employer did accommodate others ‘similar 
in their ability or inability to work.’”
132
 As before, the burden then shifts to the employer, who 
may justify the disparate treatment by proffering legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for failing 
to accommodate the plaintiff.
133
 However, the Court noted that these reasons “normally cannot 
consist simply of a claim that it is more expensive or less convenient” to accommodate pregnant 
workers.
134
 
Assuming the employer makes this showing, the plaintiff may then establish that the 
                                                                
124  Young, 135 S.Ct. at 1349-50. 
125  Id. at 1350. 
126  Id. 
127  Id. at 1352. 
128  Id.  
129  Id. at 1353 (citing Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285 (1987)). 
130  Id.  
131  Id. at 1355 (“This approach, though limited to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act context, is consistent 
with our longstanding rule that a plaintiff can use circumstantial proof to rebut an employer’s apparently legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reasons for treating individuals within a protected class differently than those outside the protected 
class.”). 
132  Id. at 1354. 
133  Id.  
134  Id.  
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employer’s alleged justifications are pretextual.
135
 This is the stage at which the Young majority 
hoped to provide additional clarity to the McDonnell Douglas framework for a PDA claim. 
Specifically, the Court held that a plaintiff can make this showing “by providing sufficient 
evidence that the employer’s policies impose a significant burden on pregnant workers” and that 
the employer’s “reasons are not sufficiently strong to justify the burden.”
136
 Along these lines, the 
majority clarified that a plaintiff can create a genuine issue of material fact that the policy 
significantly burdens pregnant workers “by providing evidence that the employer accommodates 
a large percentage of nonpregnant workers while failing to accommodate a large percentage of 
pregnant workers.”
137
 
Thus, the Young majority effectively sidestepped the issue of who courts should focus on 
as the accurate comparator when establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment under the 
PDA. Instead, the Court created a new percentage-based test, wherein the plaintiff can establish 
that an employer’s policy significantly burdens pregnant workers by comparing the aggregate 
treatment of pregnant employees to all of the employer’s nonpregnant workers. However, this 
new standard does not apply until after a plaintiff has met the initial hurdle of establishing a prima 
facie case of disparate treatment and is attempting to prove that the employer’s proffered neutral 
business reasons justifying the discriminatory treatment are pretextual. 
At the same time, the Court also suggested that recent developments in disability law 
might overshadow the decision. Specifically, the Court noted that the ADAAA—enacted in 2008 
after Young had initiated her lawsuit—had “expanded the definition of ‘disability’ under the 
ADA to make clear that ‘physical or mental impairment[s] that substantially limi[t]’ an 
individual’s ability to lift, stand, or bend are ADA-covered disabilities.”
138
 Without affirmatively 
ruling that the ADA, as amended, would have applied to Young had it been in effect at the time of 
her pregnancy, the Court nevertheless implied that this change might have impacted the case.
139
 
In any event, the Court ultimately vacated the Fourth Circuit’s decision because Young 
had created a genuine issue of material fact “as to whether UPS provided more favorable 
treatment to at least some employees whose situation cannot reasonably be distinguished from 
Young’s,” satisfying the fourth prong of McDonnell Douglas.
140
 The Fourth Circuit subsequently 
remanded the case to the district court,
141
 who will now have to determine whether UPS’s 
justifications for the disparate treatment were pretextual, and thus consider whether the combined 
effects of its accommodations policy significantly burdened pregnant workers.
142
 Or, in the words 
of the Young majority, the lower court must resolve “why, when the employer accommodated so 
many, could it not accommodate pregnant women as well?”
143
 
                                                                
135  Id.  
136  Id.  
137  Id.  
138  Id. at 1348. 
139  Id. (recognizing that the ADAAA “requires employers to accommodate employees whose temporary 
lifting restrictions originate off the job,” but ultimately “expressing no view on these statutory and regulatory changes.”).  
140  Id. at 1355. 
141  Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. 11-2078, 2015 WL 2058940 (4th Cir. Apr. 28, 2015). 
142  Young, 135 S.Ct. at 1355-56. 
143  Id. at 1355.  
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D. Justice Alito’s Concurring Opinion 
Justice Alito’s concurrence agreed with the Young majority that the PDA’s second 
clause, preceded by the word “and,” must set out an additional requirement for employer 
conduct.
144
 As Justice Alito noted, the second clause is written in the affirmative—the “employer 
‘shall’ provide equal treatment”—”while the first clause is [written in] the negative (it prohibits 
discrimination),” indicating that the clauses were to accomplish different objectives instead of the 
second merely clarifying the first clause.
145
 Thus, Justice Alito disagreed with UPS that the 
PDA’s second clause merely solidified the notion that pregnancy discrimination is a form of 
gender discrimination. Instead, Justice Alito concluded “that the second clause does not merely 
explain the first but adds a further requirement of equal treatment irrespective of intent.”
146
 
As far as how to determine whether pregnant workers are receiving equal treatment, 
Justice Alito considered it illogical to conclude that if an employer provides leave for an injured 
worker whose job involves heavy lifting, for instance, then the employer must provide the same 
leave to a pregnant employee with a desk job.
147
 Therefore, Justice Alito would have found that 
those performing the same or very similar work as the pregnant worker were the appropriate 
comparators.
148
 
At the same time, Justice Alito contended that it would be too broad a reading of the 
PDA to require pregnant workers to be similarly accommodated to workers who had analogous 
limitations and job duties irrespective of the reasons for the accommodation.
149
 For instance, he 
noted that a worker might be accommodated after performing an act of heroism for the employer 
(such as saving employees from a workplace fire), and believed that an employer should not have 
to provide a comparable accommodation to a pregnant worker in a similar job.
150
 Otherwise, the 
PDA “would go beyond anything demanded by any other antidiscrimination law”;
151
 thus, he 
interpreted the phrase “similar in the ability or inability to work” to mean “similar in relation to 
the ability or inability to work.”
152
 If an employer has a neutral business reason for providing 
preferential treatment to a nonpregnant worker performing similar tasks, then in Justice Alito’s 
view the employer would not violate the PDA.
153
 
Turning back to the facts of the case, Justice Alito found that UPS did have a valid, 
neutral reason for accommodating both workers injured on the job (in order to allow the company 
to avoid paying out workers’ compensation benefits) and those needing ADA accommodations 
                                                                
144  Young, 135 S.Ct. at 1357 (Alito, J., concurring). 
145  Id.  
146  Id.  
147  Id. at 1358. 
148  Id. at 1357-58. 
149  Id. at 1358. 
150  Id. at 1358 n.3. 
151  Id.  
152  Id. at 1359. 
153  Id.  
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(because the law mandates such an accommodation).
154
 However, he concluded that UPS had 
failed to provide “any plausible justification for treating [drivers who lost DOT certification] 
more favorably than drivers who were pregnant.”
155
 The Fourth Circuit’s rationale that there was 
a legal obstacle preventing these workers from driving was unpersuasive in his view because it 
only explained why these workers were not allowed to drive and not why UPS felt obligated to 
accommodate them.
156
 He also disagreed with the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that drivers who 
lost DOT certification still maintained the ability to perform physically demanding tasks, making 
their situation distinguishable from Young. Justice Alito believed it was “doubtful” that all drivers 
losing DOT certification could still perform physically demanding tasks, as one may lose DOT 
certification for a host of reasons, including epilepsy, cardiovascular disease, or a lost limb.
157
 
Because these workers were presumably accommodated with less physically demanding work, 
Justice Alito did not believe that UPS had adequately explained why pregnant workers could not 
have received comparable accommodations.
158
 Therefore, he agreed the case should be remanded 
as it was “not at all clear that [UPS] had any neutral business ground for treating pregnant 
workers less favorably than at least some of its nonpregnant drivers . . . .”
159
 
E. Justice Scalia’s Dissenting Opinion: Majority Conflates Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact 
Liability 
Justice Scalia’s dissent took issue with the majority’s interpretation of the second clause 
of the PDA. Specifically, he found no basis in the PDA’s text for the majority’s interpretation of 
the second clause, wherein when evaluating disparate treatment liability “courts must balance the 
significance of the burden on pregnant workers against the strength of the employer’s 
justifications for the policy” to determine if the employer’s alleged neutral policy is pretextual.
160
 
Moreover, he contended that this new test conflates disparate treatment and disparate impact 
liability by focusing on the effects of the employer’s policy on pregnant workers.
161
 Given that an 
employer is already not allowed, absent a business necessity, to utilize a practice that disparately 
impacts pregnant workers, Justice Scalia maintained the majority’s newfangled significant-burden 
balancing test was unnecessary.
162
 In addition, he believed this new test would serve to allow 
plaintiffs to increasingly bring claims for Title VII disparate treatment liability and its attendant 
enhanced remedies—including punitive damages—in cases where the more appropriate course 
would be to assert a claim under Title VII’s disparate impact provisions instead.
163
 
                                                                
154  Id. at 1360. 
155  Id.  
156  Id.  
157  Id. at 1360-61. 
158  Id. at 1361. 
159  Id.  
160  Id. at 1364 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
161  Id. at 1365. 
162  Id. at 1365-66. 
163  Id. at 1365. 
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Justice Scalia instead interpreted the PDA’s second clause to mean that pregnancy 
cannot be the reason for treating pregnant women and other workers with similar limitations 
differently.
164
 Young, he contended, was not treated differently because of her pregnancy; she 
would have been accommodated if she lost her DOT certification, for instance, and thus was 
treated the same as any other driver.
165
 Employers are allowed to draw distinctions among 
employees when accommodating injuries, he believed, so long as they follow an “evenhanded 
policy” because Title VII simply requires equal, not favored, treatment.
166
 
Justice Scalia argued that his reading of the second clause would, consistent with one of 
the PDA’s express purposes, overturn Gilbert because the disability plan at issue did not, as the 
majority claimed, exclude pregnancy on a neutral ground.
167
 Instead, he asserted that the Gilbert 
plan “single[d] pregnancy out for disfavor” by not covering sicknesses related to pregnancy or 
childbirth (or even sicknesses unrelated to pregnancy or childbirth that happened to coincide with 
the recovery from childbirth) and thus would be unlawful under his reading of the PDA.
168
 As far 
as the argument that his reading of the second clause would be superfluous as the first clause 
already defined pregnancy discrimination as a form of sex discrimination, Justice Scalia 
countered that “laws often make explicit what might already have been implicit.”
169
 
III.  IMPACT OF YOUNG AND ITS INTERSECTION WITH DISABILITY LAW 
A. Shortcomings of Young 
Although the Young decision is laudable in that it allowed the plaintiff to proceed with 
her case, there remains ambiguity in the wake of the decision as to how to properly apply the 
Court’s new methodology. While the Supreme Court definitively rejected both Young’s and 
UPS’s interpretation
170
 of the most appropriate similarly-situated comparator for determining 
whether a pregnant worker has been treated equally, it failed to provide clarity regarding which 
type of employee provides the relevant point of comparison at the stage in which a plaintiff is 
establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment under the PDA. Instead, the Court merely 
reiterated the statutory language that one looks to whether the “employer did accommodate others 
‘similar in their ability or inability to work.’”
171
 
Although the Court found that Young had established a prima facie case because “UPS 
provided more favorable treatment to at least some employees whose situation cannot reasonably 
be distinguished from Young’s,” it failed to mention how these “some employees” should be 
                                                                
164  Id. at 1362 (stating that Title VII does “not [] prohibit employers from treating  
workers differently for reasons that have nothing to do with protected traits.”). 
165  Id.  
166  Id. at 1363. 
167  Id. at 1364. 
168  Id.  
169  Id. at 1363. 
170  Id. at 1349, 1352. 
171  Id. at 1354. 
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properly identified in future cases.
172
 Thus, confusion will likely remain as to whether courts 
should compare a pregnant worker’s treatment to nonpregnant employees with similar work 
limitations or to nonpregnant employees with a similar source of injury (non-occupational, non-
ADA) in determining a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination. In short, lower courts will 
continue to face ambiguity about the appropriate comparative baseline following Young. 
The Court apparently hoped to sidestep this issue by finding that if the employer 
“accommodates a large percentage of nonpregnant workers” without providing comparable 
accommodations to pregnant workers, the plaintiff can create a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding whether any alleged non-discriminatory reasons that her employer asserted in its 
defense were, in fact, pretextual.
173
 There are several problems with this approach. For starters, 
this factor does not come into play until a plaintiff has already established a prima facie case of 
disparate treatment, meaning that the Court failed to elucidate who plaintiffs should compare 
themselves to when attempting to meet their initial burden under the McDonnell Douglas test. 
Further, there are likely to remain instances where even if the pregnant worker 
successfully identifies similarly situated employees receiving preferential accommodations, she 
would nevertheless be unable to show pretext because there are not a large enough number of 
accommodated employees to show that the policy has significantly burdened pregnant workers. In 
other words, if the employer has accommodated merely two employees with similar limitations, 
and this proof were found to meet the standard for establishing a prima facie case under the PDA 
(despite the lack of guidance from the Young Court), there would not be enough of a critical mass 
of workers to establish pretext or a significant burden on pregnant employees. This would be the 
case even though the pregnant worker is being treated differently than these two workers who are 
similar in their ability to work, in direct contravention of the language of the PDA. Indeed, as 
noted above, the difficulty in compiling this sort of statistical evidence has historically prevented 
plaintiffs from asserting analogous disparate impact claims.
174
 
Moreover, the Court’s new approach is arguably at odds with the PDA’s statutory text. 
As the majority noted in its opinion, the second clause of the PDA used the phase “other persons,” 
rather than “any other person,”
175
 thus suggesting that Congress did not intend to grant pregnant 
women a most-favored-nation status, entitling them to any accommodation an employer has made 
for any other worker. While the majority presumably believed its new formulation overcame this 
problem by shifting the focus from individual employees to a company’s workforce as a whole, 
by doing so the Court has instead effectively interpreted the relevant language as “all other 
workers,” equally in contravention of the text of the statute. Indeed, there may be cases in the 
future where a prospective plaintiff could show that a critical mass of her similarly situated 
colleagues have received her requested accommodation—suggesting some sort of pretext or 
animus on the part of her employer—but nevertheless be unable to establish the same level of 
disparity of treatment when comparing herself to thousands of workers in differing positions 
company-wide. Under the Court’s new interpretation of the PDA, this plaintiff would not prevail 
in her case, even though she had been subject to disparate treatment when compared to a number 
                                                                
172  Id. at 1355. 
173  Id. at 1354. 
174  See supra Part I.C.2. 
175  Young, 135 S.Ct. at 1350 (“The second clause, when referring to nonpregnant persons with similar 
disabilities, uses the open-ended term ‘other persons.’ It does not say that the employer must treat pregnant employees the 
‘same’ as ‘any other persons’ (who are similar in their ability or inability to work) . . . .”). 
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of relevant “other persons.” 
The Court may have fashioned this new wrinkle in McDonnell Douglas for PDA 
claims—i.e., the balancing of the significance of the burden on pregnant workers against the 
strength of the employer’s justifications for the policy—in order to create a more malleable 
standard.  This could give courts more wiggle room to take into account the specifics of a given 
instance of alleged discrimination without being bound to a rigid formula. Nevertheless, along 
with Justice Scalia’s contention that this new balancing test risks conflating disparate treatment 
and disparate impact liability,
176
 it more fundamentally fails to resolve the circuit split regarding 
how to identify the relevant comparator when establishing a prima facie case of disparate 
treatment under the PDA and thus potentially risks creating even more confusion. 
Instead, the better course of action for the majority may have been to follow the 
approach suggested by Justice Alito in his concurrence. Indeed, Justice Alito’s opinion would 
have provided more guidance to plaintiffs and courts regarding how to analyze the fourth prong of 
McDonnell Douglas in a PDA case, and thus would have imparted a clearer methodology for 
courts to follow. Specifically, under Justice Alito’s approach, one would determine whether a 
pregnant worker is receiving less favorable treatment by comparing her to employees with similar 
work limitations who are performing the same or similar job.
177
 Limiting the scope to other 
employees performing the same or similar jobs removes the problem that would arise when an 
employer accommodates its CEO (due to her seniority or importance to the company), thus 
arguably entitling more rank-and-file pregnant employees to the same accommodation. Similarly, 
it is also reasonable to conclude that just because a worker whose job rarely involves lifting is 
provided an accommodation (e.g., a receptionist), the same accommodation would not necessarily 
need to be given to a pregnant worker whose job entails more frequent lifting (e.g., a delivery 
driver) where the accommodation would more greatly impact productivity. 
Consequently, although the Supreme Court’s decision in Young certainly enhanced the 
rights of pregnant women under the PDA by finding that Young had established a prima facie 
case of pregnancy discrimination, the decision unfortunately failed to sufficiently resolve the key 
issue upon which the Court agreed to hear the case. 
B. Young Remains Important Despite the ADAAA 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Young failed to clarify who courts should 
consider as the relevant comparator in disparate treatment cases relying on indirect evidence 
under the PDA, the Young Court suggested that the ultimate impact of its decision may be 
relatively modest in light of recent developments in disabilities law.
178
 Specifically, in 2008, 
Congress expanded the definition of a disability with the Americans with Disabilities Act 
Amendment Act (ADAAA), arguably bringing many pregnancy-related conditions within the 
scope of the law. Unfortunately, contrary to the Young Court’s suggestion, most lower courts have 
not been amenable to pregnancy-related claims brought under the amended ADA, and thus it is 
doubtful whether the modified law will offer most pregnant women much relief. Therefore, the 
PDA remains an important source of relief for pregnant employees moving forward. 
                                                                
176  Id. at 1365 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Having ignored the terms of the same-treatment clause, the Court 
proceeds to bungle the dichotomy between claims of disparate treatment and claims of disparate impact.”). 
177  Id. at 1357-58 (Alito, J., concurring). 
178  Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1338, 1348 (2015). 
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1. History of Pregnancy Under the ADA 
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990 generally prohibits employers from 
discriminating against disabled employees in part by requiring employers to make “reasonable 
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified” disabled 
employee, unless such accommodation would constitute an “undue hardship” on the employer.
179
 
In order to qualify as disabled, the employee must show that she suffers from “a physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more [of her] major life activities.”
180
 In 
determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity, courts 
considered “[t]he duration or expected duration of the impairment; and [t]he permanent or long-
term impact . . .  of or resulting from the impairment,”
181
 denying ADA protection to transitory 
conditions (typically those lasting less than six months).
182
 
Historically, pregnancy and pregnancy-related medical conditions were generally not 
considered to be qualifying disabilities under the ADA because pregnancy and its associated 
complications were viewed as both (i) being too temporary in duration and (ii) not sufficiently 
limiting of a major life activity to meet the statutory definition.
183
 Instead, to qualify for a 
reasonable accommodation under the ADA, courts typically required that pregnant workers have 
a “medical condition that predated her pregnancy and was exacerbated by it.”
184
 In fact, many 
women’s rights advocates expressed concern with the idea that pregnancy would be recognized as 
a disability under the ADA, fearing that such a classification would solidify stereotypes that 
women were unfit for the workplace without accommodation.
185
 
                                                                
179  42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012). 
180  42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2012).   
181  Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 196 (2002) (citing 29 C.F.R. §§ 
1630.2(j)(2)(ii)-(iii) (2001)). 
182  See Jeannette Cox, Pregnancy as “Disability” and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 53 
B.C. L. REV. 443, 462-63 (2012) (“Courts frequently denied ADA class membership to persons whose physical or mental 
impairments caused substantial limitations that lasted less than six months.”). 
183  See Cox, supra note 182, at 467-68 (2012) (“Prior to the ADAAA, the short-term and modest nature of 
pregnancy limitations meant that a healthy pregnant worker’s only route to ADA coverage was through the ADA’s 
‘regarded as disabled’ prong, which allowed a plaintiff to argue that although her limitations did not rise to the level of an 
ADA disability, her employer terminated her based on an inaccurate belief that they did.”); Joan C. Williams, A Sip of 
Cool Water: Pregnancy Accommodation after the ADA Amendments Act, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 97, 109 (2013) 
(“Prior to the ADAAA, many courts held that pregnancy-related impairments that subsided shortly after the termination of 
pregnancy and left no lasting harm were not substantially limiting. . . . Another obstacle to establishing disability based on 
a pregnancy-related condition was the severe set of requirements courts applied for a condition to qualify as ‘substantially 
limiting’ a ‘major life activity’ under the pre-amendment ADA.”). 
184  Williams, supra note 183, at 110 (citing Patterson ex rel. Patterson v. Xerox Corp., 901 F. Supp. 274 
(N.D. Ill. 1995)). 
185  See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 98, at 250 (“[B]ringing pregnancy under the ADA would reinvigorate 
the stereotype of pregnant women as disabled and not fit for work.”); Colette G. Matzzie, Note, Substantive Equality and 
Antidiscrimination: Accommodating Pregnancy Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 82 GEO. L.J. 193, 194 (1993) 
(“The claim that the rights and needs of pregnant workers should be sought under disability law doctrines, instead of under 
theories of gender discrimination, invites suspicion. Although many feminists wish to secure tangible benefits for pregnant 
workers, they fear the characterization of pregnancy as a disability.”); Schlichtmann, supra note 70, at 358 n.167 
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In 2008, Congress expanded the definition of a disability by enacting the ADAAA, 
which was intended to make it easier for plaintiffs to prove they are disabled under the ADA.
186
 
First, the ADAAA broadens the definition of a “major life activity” to include an individual’s 
ability to lift, stand, bend, or operate a major bodily function.
187
 The EEOC’s implementing 
regulations also loosened the definition of “substantially limits” by providing that “[a]n 
impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing 
a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.”
188
 Moreover, the EEOC now 
recognizes eligible impairments of six months or less in duration as ADA disabilities,
189
 
eliminating one of the major hurdles to pre-ADAAA accommodation of pregnant workers due to 
the transitory nature of pregnancy-related conditions.
190
 
While pregnancy itself is not an ADA-covered disability under the new law,
191
 
impairments related to pregnancy may now qualify as ADA disabilities if they substantially limit 
a major life activity, which “is not meant to be a demanding standard.”
192
 As a result, at least one 
scholar has concluded that under the ADAAA “there is considerably less danger that 
characterizing pregnancy as an ADA disability will revive assumptions that pregnancy precludes 
labor force participation . . . [as] pregnancy would be just one additional physical condition that 
may . . . necessitate accommodation.”
193
 
2. Courts Have Not Been Receptive to Pregnancy-Related Claims Filed Under the Amended ADA 
While at first glance it would appear that many of the short-term conditions associated 
with pregnancy—such as lifting and standing limitations or nausea—would now fall within the 
ambit of the ADAAA’s reasonable accommodation mandate, courts applying the law in these 
cases have not been so generous.
194
 For example, in Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, the 
                                                                
(“[D]efining pregnancy itself as a disability would reverse years of argument and pressure by many women against 
traditional stereotypes of this natural function.”). 
186  42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2009); see also 29 C.F.R. Part 1630, App. § 1630.2(g) (2012); 154 CONG. REC. 
13,765 (2008) (Joint Statement of Reps. Hoyer and Sensenbrenner on the origins of the ADA Restoration Act of 2008, 
H.R. 3195) (“[T]he primary purpose of the [ADAAA] is to make it easier for people with disabilities to obtain protections 
under the ADA.”). 
187  42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)-(2) (2012).   
188  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (2012).   
189  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (2012). 
190  Cox, supra note 182, at 462-63 (“Courts frequently denied ADA class membership to persons whose 
physical or mental impairments caused substantial limitations that lasted less than six months.”).   
191  See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) app. at 378 (2012) (failing to include pregnancy as an impairment in the 
ADA). 
192  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i), (ii) (2012); 29 C.F.R. Part 1630, app. 380-81 §1630.2(h) (2012); Questions 
and Answers on the Final Rule Implementing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, EEOC.GOV, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/regulations/ada_qa_final_rule.cfm (last visited Dec. 28, 2015) (asking if pregnancy is a 
disability at Question 23). 
193  Cox, supra note 182, at 473-74.  
194  See id. at 465 (“The combined effect of the relaxation of the ADA’s severity and durational 
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only appellate-level decision to date, the court refused to consider most pregnancy-related 
complications as disabilities under the amended ADA.
195
 Instead, the court drew a distinction 
between a normal and an abnormal pregnancy, holding that pregnancy-related complications must 
be a product of a physiological disorder (an abnormal functioning of the body or an organ) in 
order to qualify as a physical impairment under the ADA.
196
 The court found that plaintiff’s 
pregnancy-related complications, which included cramping, spotting, and the increased risk of 
miscarriage, supported an inference that she had a physiological disorder of her reproductive 
system.
197
 Nonetheless, the court held she was not disabled because her impairments did not 
substantially limit the major life activity of reproduction and lifting because they were of a limited 
duration without any long-term impact.
198
 
Specifically, relying primarily on pre-ADAAA cases,
199
 the Seventh Circuit found that 
the plaintiff’s complications had lasted only four months during her pregnancy and did not cause 
any chronic limitations post-birth; thus, the court held that her impairments were too transitory in 
nature to qualify for relief under the ADA.
200
 Indeed, the court noted that given that pregnancy is, 
by definition, of a limited duration, “an ADA plaintiff asserting a substantial limitation of a major 
life activity arising from a pregnancy-related physiological disorder faces a tough hurdle.”
201
 
Many lower courts considering the issue have reached similar conclusions,
202
 clinging to a narrow 
definition of “substantially limits” under the ADA despite the fact that the EEOC eliminated this 
durational requirement in its regulations implementing the ADAAA.
203
 
Even those courts that have been more amenable to recognizing a pregnancy-related 
claim under the amended ADA have nevertheless established a high threshold for success, 
                                                                
requirements is that the ADAAA brings into the ADA’s protected class persons whose work limitations parallel the 
functional limitations pregnant workers may experience.”).   
195  656 F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 2011). 
196  Id. at 553 (citing Hernandez v. City of Hartford, 959 F. Supp. 125, 130 (D.Conn. 1997)). 
197  Id. at 554. 
198  Id. 
199  Id. at 555 (citing Muska v. AT&T Corp., No. 96C5952, 1998 WL 544407, at *9 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 25, 1998) 
(holding that plaintiff’s pregnancy-related complication of fetal distress did not substantially limit her in the major life 
activity of reproduction, because the impairment lasted only two months and did not affect her ability to carry a fetus to 
term in the future); Gabriel v. City of Chicago, 9 F. Supp.2d 974, 983 (1998) (finding an issue of fact as to whether 
plaintiff was substantially limited in the major life activity of standing when her complications persisted even after she 
gave birth)). 
200  Serednyj, 656 F.3d at 555-56. 
201  Id. at 554. 
202  Widiss, supra note 48, at 1009 (noting that “some courts deciding cases after the effective date of the 
[ADAAA] have denied disability claims in pregnancy cases that include serious complications, relying on pre-ADA 
amendment case law and not even considering whether the amendments should change the analysis.”). 
203  See, e.g., Sam-Sekur v. Whitmore Group, Ltd., 2012 WL 2244325, at *8 (2012) (finding “temporary 
impairments, pregnancies, and complications arising from pregnancy are not typically considered disabilities” and denying 
plaintiff’s pregnancy-related ADA claim due, in part, to the duration of her illnesses); Dantuono v. Davis Vision, Inc., No. 
07–CV–2234 (TCP)(ETB), 2009 WL 5196151, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2009) (holding the inability to lift more than ten 
pounds as a result of pregnancy was temporary, and therefore not a disability). 
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typically requiring the plaintiff’s symptoms to be quite severe in nature in order to qualify as a 
disability.
204
 In Mayorga v. Alorica, Inc., for instance, the court recognized that plaintiff’s 
pregnancy-related complications—which included severe back and abdominal pain, premature 
uterine contractions, increased heart rate, multiple emergency room admissions, and three weeks 
of doctor-prescribed bed rest—might qualify as a disability under the ADA.
205
 The Mayorga court 
did imply, however, that the more common conditions associated with a “healthy pregnancy” 
might not qualify as disabilities entitled to an accommodation.
206
 Instead, the court noted that only 
“a medical condition aris[ing] out of a pregnancy and [that] causes an impairment separate from 
the symptoms associated with a healthy pregnancy, or significantly intensifies the symptoms 
associated with a healthy pregnancy” could qualify as a disability under the ADAAA.
207
 
Thus, although the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Young suggested that the 
decision’s practical impact may prove to be relatively modest in light of the ADAAA,
208
 as the 
case law outlined above reveals, plaintiffs hoping to assert a pregnancy-related disability case 
under the ADA continue to face an uphill battle. As a result, the PDA remains an important 
source of relief for plaintiffs in cases where an employer has refused to accommodate an 
employee’s pregnancy. Consequently, the Young Court’s failure to sufficiently clarify the law in 
this area will have a significant practical effect on plaintiffs moving forward. 
Moreover, even if future courts were to become more amenable to pregnancy-related 
claims under the ADA, there would likely still be a number of cases in which plaintiffs would still 
fail to qualify for an accommodation under disability law. For instance, a woman seeking a light-
duty accommodation, similar to that requested in Young, could still be denied the accommodation 
under the ADA if the employer does not have the resources or alternative positions necessary to 
meet the request without creating an undue hardship.
209
 
Similarly, the ADA also would not offer relief to a plaintiff who is not suffering any 
impairment of her own due to the pregnancy, but instead is concerned for the health of her unborn 
child. For example, a pregnant surgeon performing a fluoroscopy procedure (image-guided 
surgery with radiation) may be concerned about exposing her fetus to radiation even while 
wearing a protective vest and seek to have an alternative surgeon perform the procedure. Under 
the ADA, however, the surgeon would not be considered disabled, and thus would not be entitled 
                                                                
204  See Oliver v. Scranton Materials, Inc.,  No. 3:14–CV–00549, 2015 WL 1003981, at *8 (M.D. Penn. 
Mar. 5, 2015) (stating pregnancy-related complications can be a disability under the ADAAA but dismissing without 
prejudice pregnant worker’s ADAAA claim for failure to state a claim as her complaint did not specify her specific 
complications).   
205   No. 12–21578–CIV, 2012 WL 3043021, at *1, *6 (S.D. Fla. July 25, 2012). 
206  Id. at *5. 
207  Id. at *5. See also Nayak v. St. Vincent Hosp. and Health Care Center, Inc.,  No. 1:12–cv–0817–RLY–
MJD, 2013 WL 121838, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 9, 2013) (holding that a medical resident “sufficiently pled a plausible claim 
for disability discrimination” under the ADAAA when her employer failed to accommodate her pregnancy-related 
symphysis pubis dysfunction (misalignment of the pelvis) for two months postpartum); Heatherly v. Portillo’s Hot Dogs, 
Inc., 958 F. Supp. 2d 913, 921 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (ultimately granting summary judgment for the employer despite 
acknowledging that a high-risk pregnancy could “create a triable issue of fact . . . under the ADAAA.”). 
208  Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1338, 1348 (2015). 
209  If this is the case, though, it is doubtful that the PDA would provide a remedy either, as the employer is 
unlikely to be accommodating other, similarly situated nonpregnant employees. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol19/iss2/2
GROW_FORMATTED_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/13/2016  9:54 AM 
2016] PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION 161 
to any form of accommodation. However, if the employer accommodated other nonpregnant 
surgeons seeking reassignment for these same types of surgeries—due to concern that radiation 
exposure on uncovered areas of the body increases their own risk of skin cancer or eye disease, 
for instance—then the pregnant worker could argue under the PDA that she is entitled to similar 
treatment.
210
 Thus, even if courts were to begin to more expansively apply the amended ADA to 
pregnancy-related claims in the future, the PDA would remain quite relevant to a number of 
women not covered by disability law.
211
 
That having been said, for those women who can show severe pregnancy-related 
conditions rising to the level of a disability under the existing judicial interpretation of the 
ADAAA—or if courts begin to recognize that the ADAAA’s relaxation of the durational and 
severity requirements for the requisite disability now encompasses many pregnancy-related 
conditions—then disability law will likely provide the easier path for relief, for several reasons. 
First, unlike the PDA, the ADA does not require that plaintiffs identify a similarly situated 
comparator who has received preferential treatment. Instead, the pregnant worker’s condition 
merely has to meet the definition of a disability, while her requested accommodation must be 
reasonable and not pose an undue hardship on her employer. When these conditions are met, the 
worker will be entitled to an accommodation under the ADA. Given that many pregnant women 
seek minor accommodations for pregnancy-related conditions—such as being allowed to use a 
stool or carry a water bottle
212
—they will almost certainly be deemed to have made a reasonable 
request that does not pose an undue hardship on their employers, entitling them to the requested 
accommodation under the expanded ADA. 
Second, even if a plaintiff were able to identify a valid comparator receiving preferential 
treatment and thereby establish a prima facie case under the PDA, the employer may still be in 
accordance with the law if it has a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for failing to 
accommodate the pregnant worker.
213
 As noted above, the employee would then have to argue 
that this allegedly neutral reason is pretextual by showing that the effects of the policy 
significantly burden pregnant workers.
214
 Conversely, the ADA has no analogous requirement 
forcing the plaintiff to analyze the effects of an employer’s accommodations policy, making the 
process for seeking an accommodation under the ADA more straightforward. 
Nevertheless, because the ADA appears unlikely—at least under existing judicial 
interpretations—to provide sufficient relief to most women seeking reasonable accommodations 
for pregnancy-related conditions, plaintiffs will continue to be forced to rely on the PDA to obtain 
                                                                
210  See Williams, supra note 183, at 136-37 (noting the need for the PDA and providing additional 
hypothetical examples where the ADA would fail to accommodate pregnant workers). 
211  See also Brake & Grossman, supra note 96, at 70 (arguing “that there is still value in addressing the 
harm of pregnancy discrimination specifically as a sex equality right [through the PDA as opposed so the ADA] . . . 
[because] strengthening the sex equality foundations of the right may potentially strengthen the broader social and legal 
movements for gender equality and reproductive justice.”). 
212  See, e.g., Wiseman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 08-1244-EFM, 2009 WL 1617669, at *1 (D. Kan. June 
9, 2009) (pre-ADAAA case where employer denied pregnant sales associate’s request to carry a water bottle due to her 
pregnancy-related urinary tract infections). 
213  See supra notes 133-134 and accompanying text (noting the potential defense available to employers 
under the PDA). 
214  See supra notes 135-137 and accompanying text (discussing the new methodology through which 
plaintiffs can show pretext following Young). 
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workplace accommodations from their employer. As a result, the Young Court’s failure to provide 
sufficient clarity in this area of the law will vex future plaintiffs and courts well into the future. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This article has examined the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Young v. United Parcel 
Service, Inc. Although the majority opinion in Young is certainly more worker friendly than had been the 
prior majority judicial interpretation of the PDA, pregnant employees may still struggle to satisfy the new 
standard formulated by the Court in pregnancy discrimination cases. Specifically, by failing to provide 
clarity regarding which colleagues pregnant workers should compare themselves to when asserting a case of 
disparate treatment under the PDA, plaintiffs (and courts) are likely to continue to struggle with this issue in 
the future. Although the Young Court suggested that recent developments in disability law—and the 2008 
enactment of the ADAAA in particular—could render its decision moot, this is unlikely to be the case in 
light of existing judicial interpretations of the law. Consequently, the judiciary should take additional steps to 
provide further clarity—along the lines suggested by Justice Alito in his concurring opinion in Young—
regarding which co-workers pregnant employees should compare themselves to in order to establish a prima 
facie case of disparate treatment under the PDA. 
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